MNREGA: populist leaky bucket or anti-poverty success? by Mookherjee, Dilip
22/06/2017 MNREGA: Populist leaky bucket or anti-poverty success? - IGC
http://www.theigc.org/blog/mnrega-populist-leaky-bucket-or-anti-poverty-success/ 1/4
Authors
 Dilip Mookherjee
Professor of Economics
Boston University
Published on: 13 Oct 2014
Countries: India - Bihar, India - Central
Research themes: Public Sector and
Tax, State
 MNREGA: Populist leaky bucket or
anti-poverty success?
The world’s largest workfare programme – MNREGA – formed
the backbone of the Indian United Progressive Alliance (UPA)
government’s anti-poverty programme, and may well represent
its most important legacy. While the programme was far from
perfect, it was much more effective than other existing schemes
Nine years ago, the United Progressive Alliance (UPA)
government implemented the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural
Employment Guarantee Act (MNREGA), the world’s largest
workfare programme. Rolled out in three successive stages
starting in 2005, it covered the entire country by 2008. The
scale of the programme is staggering, providing employment to
a third of India’s rural population, at an annual cost of 0.3-
0.4% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). It formed the
backbone of the UPA government’s anti-poverty and rural
safety net programme, and may well represent its most
important legacy in the long run.
Views concerning the impact of MNREGA are varied,
predictably along partisan lines. Critics argue that it is populist,
politically motivated and manipulated by the UPA for its own
electoral advantage, beset with corruption and leakages. It is
said to be responsible for runaway fiscal deficits, inflation and
slowdown of growth. Supporters argue the programme has
succeeded in reducing rural poverty, building infrastructure and
strengthening local governance. Which of these two views is
closer to the truth?
To answer this, it is essential to review ground-level evidence
concerning how MNREGA has actually performed. As it turns
out, an impressive amount of research has appeared recently,
appraising functioning and impacts of MNREGA on various
dimensions. Over the past month, I managed to find over 20
articles based on econometric analysis of large scale household
surveys, besides a few books, field studies and government
reports. Written by academic scholars both in India and abroad,
mostly using National Sample Survey (NSS) data, and aimed for
publication in academic journals, the papers are free of partisan
bias. Each paper focuses on a specific question, using a
particular dataset and research methodology. Trying to evaluate
the programme based on these analyses, I was reminded of the
ancient fable in which six blind men try to assess an elephant
from six different angles. Nevertheless, the following broad
picture emerges.
The broad facts are the following. Launched in February 2006,
the programme was rolled out in three successive phases, with
the first phase comprising 200 of the poorest districts, and all
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the first phase comprising 200 of the poorest districts, and all
618 rural districts covered by 2009-10. Each rural household is
entitled to 100 days of work per year, at a guaranteed minimum
wage, to be provided within 15 days of application (failing
which the household qualifies for unemployment benefits) and
within 5 km of the household’s residence. Since 2009-10, it has
provided employment to over 50 million households annually,
with an average of 42 days per year per household, at a cost of
around Rs. 37,000 crores ($6.16 bn approx.). Gram
panchayats are given the responsibility to administer the
projects, which typically involve construction of local
infrastructure aimed at providing water security, soil
conservation, flood control and raising land productivity. The
projects are required to be decided following Gram
Sabha meetings. A 60:40 split between labour and material
costs is mandated Government of India 2012).
Implementation
The evidence shows wide variations across states with regard to
implementation of these provisions: lower income states with
limited administrative capacities have tended to lag noticeably
behind five ‘star’ states (Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Rajasthan,
Himachal Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh [AP]). Less than half the
rural population was aware about the work-on-demand feature,
and less than a fifth of their unemployment benefit entitlement
beyond the 15 day waiting period.  Gram Sabhas are held
infrequently, with low participation rates. There is substantial
rationing, particularly in Bihar, Odisha and Jharkhand – in
2009-10 while 25% of rural households were provided work,
19% sought work but did not get employed. A lot of the
employment tends to be provided in the spring (slack) season,
because it becomes difficult to undertake construction projects
during the monsoon, and Gram Panchayats do not want to
create labour market shortages during peak harvest seasons.
Household surveys and social audits reveal numerous
complaints, involving non-issuance of dated receipts, non-
payment of unemployment allowance, payment of less than full
wages, and especially, delayed payments. In some regions,
resistance from the local elite has prevented social audits being
carried out. In states such as AP where audits have been carried
out, there is no sign of abatement of these complaints across
successive years. A rising proportion (ranging from 25-50%)
concern non-payment or delayed payment of wages, besides
bribes (14-20%), benami payments (16-19%) and missing
records (4-6%). There were fewer complaints regarding
material irregularities, but these are intrinsically harder to
detect. Follow-up disciplinary action following discovered
irregularities was largely lacking, with major or medium actions
taken in only 3.4% of cases. A recent study in eight AP districts
carefully estimates the overall extent of leakage of funds from
the programme at 30%, which went down substantially as a
result of recent use of smartcards to disburse payments. Surveys
in districts in other states (Bihar, Chattisgarh, Odisha and
Rajasthan) indicate leakage rates ranging from 5 to 40%.
Anti-poverty impact
To assess anti-poverty impacts, many studies have examined
relative effects on growth of wages, employment, consumption,
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relative effects on growth of wages, employment, consumption,
savings, child labour, schooling between households exposed to
the scheme across different phases. One methodology
(Difference-In-Difference [DID]) compares these measures of
well-being for households before and after coverage, after
accounting for pre-existing trends and various household
characteristics. The DID estimates show a rise of daily wages of
approximately 5% that can be attributed to the programme, an
estimate that rises to 9% in the ‘star’ states. Different studies
using this methodology find corresponding positive effects on
food and non-food consumption, calorie and protein intakes,
and on savings. Rural-urban migration rates have dropped,
owing largely to reduction in ‘distress migration’, and urban
unemployment rates fell by 7%. Child labour fell by
approximately 10%, with no corresponding effects on school
enrolment, and significant positive effects on grade progression
and test scores (larger even than observed effects of conditional
cash transfer schemes in Latin America). These benefits were
typically larger for lower castes, illiterates and women.
An alternative methodology (Regression Discontinuity [RD])
examines differences between districts that just missed
belonging to one phase of the rollout with those that just made
it. This approach yields more conservative estimates of the anti-
poverty impacts, with no average impact on wages. Yet even
this approach shows strong positive effects – a 50% drop in
poverty – for the most vulnerable sections of the population
(Scheduled Castes [SCs] and Scheduled Tribes [STs]) during the
slack season. The effects are more pronounced in periods of low
rainfall. The stronger safety net was accompanied by a move
out of employment to self-employment and non-agricultural
employment for males, while women’s labour force
participation rates rose. Field studies corroborate these
statistical results.
Macroeconomic effects
There is comparatively less evidence concerning the broader
macroeconomic effects of MNREGA on growth, fiscal deficits
or inflation. These are intrinsically harder to estimate.
Nevertheless, my own broad assessment is that NREGA had
relatively little impact on macro aggregates, compared to other
key determinants. The adverse macroeconomic events set in
only after 2009-10, by which time MNREGA had already been
fully implemented. Slowing of growth rates owe to many
different factors, such as ‘policy paralysis’, problems with
environmental clearances, land acquisition, recession in the
world economy, appreciation of the real exchange rate, and
fiscal and monetary contraction since 2010. The rise in inflation
is also a post-2010 phenomenon, especially marked in food
articles such as milk, edible oils, sugar, fish and vegetables in
which rising rural wages are unlikely to have played an
important role. Moreover, the RD-based econometric evidence
fails to find positive effects on average rural wages, with most
of the positive effect concentrated in the agricultural slack
season.
Safety net for the most vulnerable, but poorly implemented
Summing up the evidence, what seems most striking is the effect
of MNREGA in providing a safety net and reducing poverty for
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of MNREGA in providing a safety net and reducing poverty for
the most vulnerable sections of the rural population. Providing
employment to rural unskilled labour is without doubt the
single most direct and effective way of reducing poverty
amongst the most vulnerable sections of the population.
Undoubtedly the price tag is large, around 0.4% of GDP. But
on the other hand the scheme provides employment to one third
of the rural population who are the poorest. With regard to
targeting success, it beats hollow the other big-ticket subsidy
items in government budgets – food, fertiliser and petroleum
subsidies, each of which account for 0.8% of GDP, and benefit
mainly the middle class rather than the poor. A leakage rate of
30% or less seems a lot better than the 90% leakage rates
associated with food subsidies in India. MNREGA is far from
perfect, but a lot more effective than any other existing scheme
in benefitting the poor.
It is no surprise therefore that MNREGA helped UPA gain re-
election in the 2009 general elections. There is detailed RD-
based evidence showing that UPA reaped electoral benefits from
rolling out MNREGA in 2009, and that MNREGA budgetary
allocations across districts and blocks have been manipulated in
certain states to increase these benefits. But there is also recent
evidence that the electoral benefits which arose for the Indian
National Congress (INC) in early stages of implementation,
have turned into a liability in later stages. As time goes by,
citizen expectations from the scheme have risen, while problems
of implementation have become more evident. Failure to
implement MNREGA properly may thus have been a political
liability for the INC in the recent election. Herein lies a
cautionary tale for parties in power when they introduce
populist schemes – failure to implement them properly will turn
out to be a political liability in the long run.
